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Essential Data
Certain firms in the Internet economy may exclude competitors by refusing
to deal data. Such conduct may impede innovation. But antitrust law lacks a
coherent response to monopoly of data. This Comment proposes a policy
inspired by duties to share. Over a century ago, courts devised an "essential
facilities" doctrine that required monopolists to share inputs essential to
competition with rivals. These inputs included phone lines and bridges. I
contend that the essential facilities doctrine sometimes should require open
access to data.
This Comment proceeds in two Parts. Part I describes the problems with
data monopolies and provides an example of an essential data dispute. The Part
goes on to explain the essential facilities doctrine and identify criticisms that
led to the doctrine's rejection. It closes by describing an essential data claim.
Part II contends that criticisms of the essential facilities doctrine attenuate
when a dataset becomes the facility to which a rival seeks access.
I. ONLINE DATA AND ESSENTIAL FACILITIES
Part I has three sections. Part L.A explains the role of data in the online
economy and provides an example of an essential data claim. Part I.B
introduces the essential facilities doctrine, as well as the doctrine's demise. Part
I.C sets forth the elements of an essential data claim and situates the concept in
commentary and precedent.
A. Online Data
Sometimes data cause disputes. A company called PeopleBrowsr faced one
late in 2012. According to PeopleBrowsr, its service helped clients monitor and
analyze conversations online and relied on data from a social network called
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Twitter.' PeopleBrowsr also claimed that it had used Twitter data for years.
But Twitter told PeopleBrowsr that the social network would revoke access to
its data at the end of November 2012.' Twitter alleged that its business model
had evolved.4 According to PeopleBrowsr, Twitter thought the monitoring
company no longer "fit."'
PeopleBrowsr alleged that a Twitter shutoff "would [have] devastate[d]
PeopleBrowsr's business." 6 So the company stated that it negotiated with
Twitter for access. 7 PeopleBrowsr said that negotiations failed and then it
sued.8 Shutoff, PeopleBrowsr said, would violate California competition law.9
"[C]ompetition in the market for analysis of Twitter data" would founder and
innovation in the data's use would slow." Not so, Twitter said: shutoff
preserved the incentives of entrepreneurs to innovate and violated neither
California nor federal antitrust law." Twitter, the company said, "has the right
to control its data."
2
This Comment challenges that and similar claims. Refusals to deal data can
help firms free ride on rivals' investments and maintain monopolies by
excluding competitors. 3 But courts supply no consistent response to the
antitrust questions that data pose: PeopleBrowsr and Twitter settled and
1. Complaint 5, PeopleBrowsr, Inc. v. Twitter, Inc., No. CGC-12-52639 3 (Cal. Super. Ct.
Nov. 27, 2o12)("By analyzing its iooo-day data mine of tweets, PeopleBrowsr empowers
individual web users and organizations to find value in the massive volumes of data
produced on Twitter. It also provides organizations deep insight regarding consumers'
reactions to products and services .. .
2. Id. 4.
3. Id. 9, 12o; Mike Isaac, Data Nerds Revolt! PeopleBrowsr Takes Twitter to
Court Over Alleged Anticompetitive Actions, ALL THINGS D (Nov. 28, 2012,
9:26 PM), http://allthingsd.com/2o121128/data-nerds-revolt-peoplebrowsr-takes-twitter
-to-court-over-alleged-anticompetitive-actions [http://perma.cc/VF7D-8ZCA].
4. Defendant Twitter, Inc.'s Notice of Motion and Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Complaint at
1, PeopleBrowsr, Inc. v. Twitter, Inc., No. 4:12-cv-06120-EMC (N.D. Cal. Mar. 6, 2013).
s. Complaint, supra note 1, 114.





11. Defendant Twitter, Inc.'s Notice of Motion and Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Complaint,
supra note 4, at 9-12.
12. Id. at ii.
13. See infra Part II.A.
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PeopleBrowsr got access for about eight months. 4 Two software developers a
decade apart sued online marketplaces for withholding data and got no answer
on their antitrust claims."5 The Federal Trade Commission in 2011 reportedly
opened an inquiry into claims that Twitter hobbled a potential rival by
revoking access to data. '6 The Commission never filed a complaint.1 7
B. The Essential Facilities Doctrine and Its Critics
Antitrust law generally preserves the "right[s] of trader[s] or
manufacturer[s]" to choose the "parties with whom [they] deal.' But in
"limited circumstances" a refusal to deal violates Section 2 of the Sherman Act,
which prohibits monopolization. 9 Under the essential facilities doctrine, a
duty to deal arises when a monopolist refuses to share inputs essential to
competition despite the feasibility of doing so.'
The essential facilities doctrine dates at least to 1912, when "a group of
railroad operators obtained ... the only railroad bridges across the Mississippi
River at St. Louis."' Because the "most extraordinary" topography of the
region rendered it "impossible for any railroad company to pass through...
without using [the group's] facilities," the Supreme Court required that the
group deal with outsiders on "just and reasonable terms."'
14. David McAfee, Twitter, PeopleBrowsr Settle Dispute Over Data Access, LAw36o (Apr. 29, 2013,
5:59 PM), http://www.law36o.com/articles/436973/twitter-peoplebrowsr-settle-dispute
-over-data-access [http://perma.cc/6BRL-J5WZ].
iS. See Craigslist, Inc. v. 3Taps, Inc., 942 F. Supp. 2d 962, 982 (N.D. Cal. 2013) (bifurcating and
staying discovery on antitrust counterclaims); see also eBay, Inc. v. Bidder's Edge, Inc., loo
F. Supp. 2d io58, 1072-73 (N.D. Cal. 2000) (holding that a court evaluating whether to issue
a preliminary injunction need not address an antitrust counterclaim); eBay, No. C-99-21200
RMW, 2000 VL 1863564 (N.D. Cal. July 25, 2000) (denying eBay's motion to dismiss
Bidder's Edge's antitrust counterclaims). The parties settled before trial. See Stipulation for
Dismissal with Prejudice, eBay, No. C-99-21200 RMW (N.D. Cal. Mar. 6, 2001), ECF No.
178.
16. Amir Efrati, Antitrust Regulator Makes Twitter Inquiries, WALL ST. J., July 1,
2011, http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424o527o23o445o6o4576418184234003812
[http://perma.cc/TS 9 Z-URY2].
17. E-mail from Elizabeth Lordan, Pub. Affairs Specialist, Fed. Trade Comm'n Off. of Pub.
Affairs, to author (Sept. 17, 2014, 2:52 PM EST) (on file with author).
18. United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300, 307 (1919).
ig. Pacific Bell Tel. Co. v. Linkline Commc'ns, Inc., 555 U.S. 438, 447-48 (2009).
2o. MCI Commc'ns Corp. v. AT&T, 708 F.2d 1o81, 1132-33 (7 th Cit. 1983).
21. Thomas G. Krattenmaker & Steven C. Salop, Anticompetitive Exclusion: Raising Rivals' Costs
to Achieve Power Over Price, 96 YALE L.J. 209, 234 (1986).
22. United States v. Terminal R.R. Ass'n, 224 U.S. 383, 397, 405, 411 (1912).
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The Supreme Court never adopted the essential facilities doctrine by
name. 23 But lower courts and commentators drew on the doctrine.24 The Court
in 1972 made a power company share transmission wires with the company's
rivals.2' A decision of the Court a decade later required two ski mountains to
continue offering a joint ticket after one sought to withdraw.
6
Today, little remains of the essential facilities doctrine. Commentators
weakened the doctrine with three criticisms. First, monopolists could not
extract additional profits from consumers by refusing to deal.7 So efficiency
and not exclusion likely motivated behavior scrutinized by the essential
facilities doctrine. Second, the doctrine weakened incentives to compete:
dominant firms would not erect infrastructure lest a court appropriate the
investment for a rival's use.2 Finally, the doctrine placed courts into the role of
regulators, though they lacked the capacity to administer the sharing that the
doctrine required. 9 These concerns held sway: the Supreme Court in 2004
denied "[]ever recogniz[ing]" the doctrine of essential facilities.3'
C. Essential Data
This Comment argues that a claim to essential data-data essential to
competition- should require the same elements as a claim to an essential
facility. First, the monopolist must control and deny access to the data that the
plaintiff seeks. 1 Second, competition must fail without the data.' Third, the
23. Verizon Commc'ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, 540 U.S. 398,411 (2004) (stating
that the Court has never recognized an essential facilities doctrine); see Aspen Skiing Co. v.
Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 611 n.44 (1985) (requiring ski mountains to
continue offering a joint ticket but finding it unnecessary to consider the essential facilities
doctrine).
24. See, e.g., MCI, 708 F.2d at 1132-33; Hecht v. Pro-Football, Inc., 570 F.2d 982, 992 (D.C. Cir.
1977); see also Phillip Areeda, Essential Facilities: An Epithet in Need of Limiting Principles, 58
ANTITRUST L.J. 841, 847-52 (1990) (providing an overview of three Supreme Court cases
often cited to support the essential facilities doctrine); Brett Frischmann & Spencer Weber
Waller, Revitalizing Essential Facilities, 7S ANTITRUST L.J. 1, 6-8 (20o8) (discussing the
traditional essential facilities doctrine).
25. Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366, 368-69, 382 (1973).
26. Aspen Skiing, 472 U.S. at 611.
27. ROBERT BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 229 (1978); Richard A. Posner, Exclusionary
Practices and the Antitrust Laws, 41 U. CHI. L. REv. 5o6, 523-24 (1974).
28. 3B PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW 772 (3d ed. 2008).
29. Areeda, supra note 24, at 853; Michael Boudin, Antitrust Doctrine and the Sway of Metaphor, 75
GEO. L.J. 395, 401 (1986).
30. Verizon Commc'ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, 540 U.S. 398,411 (2004).
31. See MCI Commc'ns Corp. v. AT&T, 7o8 F.zd lO81, 1132-33 ( 7th Cir. 1983).
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plaintiff must lack means to duplicate the data.33 Fourth, the monopolist must
have means to share the data. 4 Fifth and finally, an essential facility plaintiff
must demonstrate the defendant's monopoly power in an antitrust market. 1
Several recent claims fit this description. One is Twitter's attempt to
disconnect PeopleBrowsr, discussed at the beginning of this Part. A second
relates to a 2000 dispute between eBay and Bidder's Edge, an aggregator of
auction prices, 6: eBay, which reportedly controlled eighty-seven percent of
auction traffic, 7 refused to deal with an ecosystem firm that made tools for
users to access auction prices.' 8 A third concerns a dispute that reached federal
court in 201239 : Craigslist, a dominant provider of online classifieds, sued
3Taps, a start-up that obtained and shared data based on Craigslist's
classifieds .
40
Each dispute started with data created by users of a monopolist's platform.
Competitors could not duplicate the data because of network effects: each user
who used the monopolist's platform made that platform more valuable to every
other user. So no competing dataset emerged. For example, the set of messages
that Twitter controlled faced no competition from a rival network: users who
32. See Twin Labs., Inc. v. Weider Health & Fitness, 900 F.2d 566, 570 (2d Cir. 199o).
33. See MCI, 708 F.2d at 1132.
34. See id. at 1133.
3s. See United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966) ("The offense of monopoly
... has two elements: (1) the possession of monopoly power in the relevant market .... ");
Viacom Int'l Inc. v. Time Inc., 785 F. Supp. 371, 376 n.12 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (stating that the
essential facilities doctrine is "more properly characterized as a label that may aid in the
analysis of a monopoly claim, not a statement of a separate violation of law"); cf. Marina
Lao, Networks, Access, and "Essential Facilities": From Terminal Railroad to Microsoft, 62
SMU L. REv. 557, 583 (2009) (indicating that applying the essential facilities doctrine to
information is imprudent where a firm lacks monopoly power in the market).
36. eBay, Inc. v. Bidder's Edge, Inc., too F. Supp. 2d 1O58 (N.D. Cal. 2000); eBay, No. C-99-
21200 RMW, 2000 WL 1863564 (N.D. Cal. July 25, 2000) (denying eBay's motion to
dismiss Bidder's Edge's antitrust counterclaims).
37. Bidder's Edge Sues eBay, Claiming Unfair Business Tactics, Dow JONES Bus. NEWS, Feb. 7,
2000.
38. As in the case of Twitter, competitor complaints about eBay's actions prompted
agency scrutiny. John R. Wilke, Justice Department Looks into Efforts by eBay to Bar
Entry of Software 'Bots', WALL ST. J., Feb. 4, 2000, http://online.wsj.com/news/articles
/SB949624391916o67802 [http://perma.cc/ 89PD-VUGH]. The U.S. Department of Justice
opened an antitrust investigation into the activities that gave rise to the Bidder's Edge
litigation. Two years later, the probe concluded without action. Antitrust Probe Ends, WALL
ST. J. EUR., Mar. 27, 2002, at A6.
39. Complaint, Craigslist, Inc. v. 3Taps, Inc., 942 F. Supp. 2d 962 (N.D. Cal. 2013) (No. CV-12-
03816 CRB), 2012 WL 7061539.
40. Id.
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wanted to listen went where people were talking. The set of prices that eBay
controlled faced no competition from a rival auction: sellers went where people
were buying.4' The disputes in each case involved refusals to deal monopolized
inputs protected by barriers to entry. Those circumstances invite the
application of the essential facilities doctrine.'
II. RESPONDING TO CRITICS OF THE ESSENTIAL FACILITIES
DOCTRINE
This Part contends that criticisms of the essential facilities doctrine
attenuate when rivals invoke the doctrine against a defendant that has withheld
data. Refusals to deal data may raise monopoly profits and lower consumer
welfare. Essential data remedies benefit consumers without depriving
innovators of incentives to invest. Finally, courts may administer access to data
more easily than access to physical facilities.
Data essential to competition-essential data-can exist when firms act
alone or with others.43 Courts have forced access in the latter case but not the
former.' Firms that act alone may originate data or build platforms for others
to originate data. Microsoft and Intel, for example, originated technical data4'
essential to competition in downstream markets. Marina Lao has argued for
access to data in such a case. 46 This Comment extends the case for access to
41. Each additional market participant increases that market's liquidity. Better prices result. A
rival market with fewer participants will offer lower prices (for sellers) or higher prices (for
buyers) than the incumbent. These inferior prices will induce buyers and sellers to trade on
the incumbent market, further depriving the rival of liquidity. See Daniel M. Gray, The
Essential Role of Regulation in Promoting Equity Market Competition, 1 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. &
COM. L. 395, 397 (2007).
42. MCI Commc'ns Corp. v. AT&T, 708 F.2d io81, 1132-33 (7th Cir. 1983).
43. Intergraph Corp. v. Intel Corp., 195 F. 3d 1346, 135o-51 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (acting alone);
Marin Cnty. Bd. of Realtors, Inc. v. Palsson, 549 P.2d 833, 842-43 (Cal. 1976) (acting with
others).
44. Compare Grillo v. Bd. of Realtors, 219 A.2d 635, 650 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1966) (forcing
access to a multiple listing service that was operated as a joint venture), with SolidFX, LLC
v. Jeppesen Sanderson, Inc., 935 F. Supp. 2d. lO69, 1O83-84 (D. Colo. 2013) (rejecting the
application of the essential facilities doctrine to aviation data that the defendant originated),
and White Directory of Rochester, Inc. v. Rochester Tel. Corp., 714 F. Supp. 65, 70
(W.D.N.Y. 1989) (rejecting the application of the essential facilities doctrine to listings that
utility originated).
45. See Intergraph, 195 F.3d at 1357; Case T-2o1/o 4 , Microsoft Corp. v. Comm'n, 2007 E.C.R. II-
036o1.
46. Lao, supra note 35, at 558-59 (2009) (arguing that a "theoretically sound basis for antitrust
intervention" exists because sharing interoperability information permits competition for "a
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platforms: that is, to firms whose data monopolies derive from users who must
originate data to consume the functionality that the firms' technology enables.
A. Motive to Refuse
Critics of the essential facilities doctrine begin by asking why monopolists
would refuse to deal. Single monopoly profit theory holds that monopolists
may extract monopoly rents from a market without selling to consumers.47
Assuming there is a competitive market for the end product whose input the
monopolist controls, monopolists may charge downstream firms one fee or
royalty per product and thereby induce downstream firms to produce only the
monopoly quantity. The monopolist could do no better if it sold to consumers
itself.
Data monopolists in emerging industries lie beyond this model. First, one
dataset can supply zero or infinite final goods and services. When 3Taps gets
data from Craigslist ads, 3Taps can serve that data to anyone who wants to see
goods and services listed for sale on Craigslist's exchange. Second, a data
monopolist may lack the ability to monitor the quantity of final goods and
services produced using the monopolist's data. When Bidder's Edge scrapes
prices from eBay, eBay may never learn that a user has viewed those prices on
Bidder's Edge. As a result, uncertainty may blur the final demand curve that a
data monopolist faces.
If the monopolist cannot predict final demand and must make sunk
investments in order to enter the final market, the monopolist may prefer
temporarily to deal with a downstream rival. The rival's success or failure
provides a proxy for otherwise unobservable final demand. If the data
monopolist retains the ability to terminate the rival's access, then the
monopolist has obtained a costless option on a downstream market. For
example, PeopleBrowsr said that it started analyzing Twitter data on the basis
of the social network's promise to make that data available. 4s Twitter,
necessity" that facilities' "natural monopoly characteristics or strong network effects" would
otherwise bar).
47. See, e.g., 3B AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 28, 773c ("[A] monopolist cannot earn
double profits by monopolizing a second, vertically related market."); BoRK, supra note 27,
at 229 ("[V]ertically related monopolies can take only one monopoly profit"); Posner, supra
note 27, at 524.
48. Complaint, supra note 1, 27-33 ("PeopleBrowsr Built a Valuable Business in Reliance on
Twitter's Commitment to Keep Access to Its Data Open.").
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PeopleBrowsr said, refused to share data only after PeopleBrowsr
demonstrated the existence of a lucrative market for analytics.49
So a data monopolist might pursue a strategy of free riding that ends with a
refusal to deal. That means that uncertainty about market opportunities makes
real the monopolist that Judge Richard A. Posner could imagine only "with
difficulty": the monopolist who "entice[s] new firms into its market only to
destroy them.""° If a plaintiff cannot bring an essential data claim to mitigate
the threat of exclusion, then the risk of entry-and, therefore, the cost of
innovation- will rise.
Data monopolists might also refuse to deal in order to protect their
monopolies. A monopolist may fear that a downstream rival's tools will
eventually supplant the monopolist's product altogether."1 If the monopoly
product provides to users data produced by a network, then refusal to share
those data may impede a rival that seeks to develop a competing product. For
example, according to Craigslist's rivals, they cannot promise market prices to
buyers without Craigslist's data. 2 Or a social network's rival might choose to
challenge the network by first attracting users with messages passed on the
incumbent network.s3 Refusing to deal data forecloses such a tactic.
Data monopolists may have multiple motives for refusing to deal data to
potential competitors. Courts should not automatically ascribe to those refusals
the procompetitive explanations put forward by critics of the essential facilities
doctrine. 4
49. Id. 92 ("After encouraging PeopleBrowsr and other developers to develop innovative
products that opened up lucrative new markets analyzing Twitter data, Twitter has now
acted to take control of those markets.").
50. Olympia Equip. Leasing Co. v. W. Union Tel. Co., 797 F.2d 370, 376 (7th Cir. 1986).
51. See, e.g., United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 64 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (finding that the
developer of an operating system violated Section 2 of the Sherman Act by excluding
technologies with the potential to challenge the operating system's monopoly).
52. Defendant 3Taps, Inc.'s First Amended Counterclaim at 46-49, Craigslist, Inc. v. 3Taps,
Inc., 942 F. Supp. 2d 962 (N.D. Cal. 2013) (No. CV-12-o3816 CRB), 2012 WL 8233034.
53. NICK BILTON, HATCHING TWITTER: A TRUE STORY OF MONEY, POWER, FRIENDSHIP, AND
BETRAYA 244 (2013) (describing a potential Twitter rival that planned "to build a Twitter-
network clone that could be used to divert people away from Twitter to an entirely new
service"); see also Dennis W. Carlton & Michael Waldman, The Strategic Use of Tying to
Preserve and Create Market Power in Evolving Industries, 33 RAND J. ECON. 194, 207 (2002)
("[T]he monopolist will sometimes deter entry into the primary market in period 2 by
behaving in a manner that causes cohort i consumers to purchase complementary units
from the monopolist.").
54. See, e.g., BORK, supra note 27, at 231; David J. Gerber, Note, Rethinking the Monopolist's Duty
to Deal: A Legal and Economic Critique of the Doctrine of 'Essential Facilities,' 74 VA. L. REv.
lO69, 1o84 (1988) ("The law should presume that efficiency motivates monopolists absent
any anticompetitive incentive for refusals to deal.").
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B. Incentives to Invest
Critics next charged that the essential facilities doctrine distorted firms'
incentives to invest." The prospect of future antitrust liability "could
significantly reduce the incentive of entrepreneurs to innovate in areas . . .
involv[ing] essential facilities."56 The Supreme Court's Trinko decision
adopted this argument, s7 which has since met with approval in courts of
appeal."
However, antitrust law does not offer clear guidance about when a
defendant's argument about reduced incentives will suffice to rebut an essential
facilities claim. The Supreme Court last ruled for an essential facilities plaintiff
in Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Co.s9 Aspen's unanimous Court
held that the prospect of profits from "exclusionary" conduct does not justify a
refusal to deal. 60 But as Einer Elhauge asserts, "[m]onopolization doctrine
currently uses vacuous standards and conclusory labels that provide no
meaningful guidance about which conduct will be condemned as
exclusionary." 6' So data monopolists' claims that refusals to deal protect
"incentives of companies to innovate and compete,,62 or reduce "free-riding on
[the monopolist's] substantial investment of time, effort, and expense,"6 3
presuppose the sufficiency of business justifications that antitrust law has yet
to accept.
55. HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF COMPETITION AND ITS
PRACTICE 340 (4 th ed. 2011) ("Forced Sharing Undercuts Incentives to Develop Alternative
Sources of Supply.").
56. Gregory J. Werden, The Law and Economics of the Essential Facility Doctrine, 32 ST. Louis U.
L.J. 433, 473 (1987); see also Caswell 0. Hobbs III et al., Panel Discussion: Exclusionary
Conduct, 57 ANTITRUST L.J. 723, 742 (1988) ("[The monopolist] got out in front when it
wasn't at all clear that the [essential] facility was going to work, and now someone else
wants to come along and help themselves [sic].").
S. Verizon Commc'ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, 540 U.S. 398, 407-08 (2004)
("[Forced sharing] may lessen the incentive for the monopolist, the rival, or both to invest
in those economically beneficial facilities.").
58. See, e.g., Novell, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 731 F.3d 1064, 1072 (ioth Cit. 2013); Cablevision
Sys. Corp. v. FCC, S97 F. 3d 13o6, 1322 (D.C. Cir. 2010); MetroNet Servs. Corp. v. Qwest
Corp., 383 F.3 d 1124, 1131 (9 th Cit. 2004).
59. Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 611 (1985).
6o. Id. at 6o8 (declining to find business justification in defendant's interest in "reducing
competition in the Aspen market over the long run").
61. Einer Elhauge, Defining Better Monopolization Standards, 56 STAN. L. REv. 253, 253 (2003).
6a. Defendant Twitter, Inc.'s Notice of Motion and Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Complaint,
supra note 4, at 11.
63. Complaint, supra note 39, 144.
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Moreover, the incentive claim rests on the ex ante expectations of
entrepreneurs, but the experience of the data monopolists identified in this
Comment suggests that facility ownership did not motivate entry into the
markets that the monopolists came to dominate. For example, Twitter
launched a tool to connect; early monetization discussions revolved around
advertising.64 Craigslist began as its founder's events circular; the site
remained "wedded to the idea that [it] was a community service" years after its
launch.6' eBay's first revenues came from transaction fees, and its business plan
predicted future revenue from software licensing.66
This could change. Data licensing revenues at Twitter rose almost fifty
percent in 2013, to $70 million.6 7 In April 2014 the company bought Gnip, a
data reseller.68 Linkedln, a social network for professionals, received most of its
2013 revenue from hiring professionals who bought access to the network's
data.69
The application of any essential data doctrine to those who invest in
pursuit of data monopolies will require finesse. But essential facilities
precedents supply a framework for such a future: the Supreme Court's refusal-
to-deal precedents impose sharing only after reviewing a monopolist's reasons
for exclusion.7' Whether those reasons may include monopoly profits, if the
64. BILTON, supra note 53, at 1O9.
65. Gary Wolf, Why Craigslist Is Such a Mess, WIRED, Aug. 24, 2009, http://archive.wired
.com/entertainment/theweb/magazine/17-o9/ff craigslist ?currentPage=2 [http://perma.cc
/GFW 4 -7DX9].
66. ADAM COHEN, THE PERFECT STORE: INSIDE EBAY 71-72 (2002).
67. Twitter, Inc., Annual Report (Form lo-K) 55 (Mar. 6, 2014), http://www.sec.gov/Archives
/edgar/data/418o91/oooo95012314003031/twtr-lok20131231.htm [http://perma.cc/FME4
-QMTE].
68. See Elizabeth Dwoskin & Yoree Koh, Twitter Agrees to Buy Data Partner Gnip, WALL ST. J.,
Apr. 15, 2014, http://online.wsj.con/news/articles/SB0001424o527o23o45722o45795o34o256
4724312 [http://perma.cc/VDN-52AV] (noting that Twitter's acquisition of Gnip was "a sign
that [Twitter] wants a bigger role in analyzing tweets for businesses hungry for insights
from social media"); Erin Griffith, Twitter Plays Defense with Deal for Gnip, FORTUNE, Apr.
15, 2014, http://fortune.com/2o14/o4/15/twitter-plays-defense-with-deal-for-gnip [http://
perma.cc/3XH6-ZG7P ] ("The deal marks a turning point for social data."); Mike Isaac,
With Gnip Buy, Twitter Starts Taking Its Data Business Seriously, RE/CODE (Apr. 15,
2014, 7:27 AM), http://recode.net/2O14/04/15/with-gnip-buy-twitter-starts-taking-its-data-
business-seriously [http://perma.cc/3MT 5 -MNCQJ ("Twitter didn't quite take its data
licensing revenue stream seriously for a long time .... Perhaps with the Gnip acquisition,
that stance has changed.").
69. Linkedln Corp., Annual Report (Form io-K) 8-9, 48 (Feb. 13, 2014), http://www.sec.gov
/Archives/edgar/data/1271o24/ooo 144530514000439/a2o131231- loxkdocument.htm [http://
perma.cc/36JR-FRLW].
70. See, e.g., Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 6o8 (1985).
124:8 67 201 4
ESSENTIAL DATA
profits require exclusion and motivate investment, remains an unresolved
question.' Partial answers exist; courts and scholars view with skepticism
justifications advanced by monopolists who deal with some, but not with
rivals.' Moreover, courts may scrutinize proffered justifications for pretext,
safeguarding ex ante incentives only where those incentives are endangered.73
C. Administrability
Finally, critics questioned courts' capacity to identify and remedy
anticompetitive refusals to deal.74 This administrability critique asserted that
generalist judges' reviews of novel practice and complex economics for
"exclusionary" conduct became risky affairs.7' And once judges condemned
refusals to deal, they could not enforce remedies without taking on the burdens
of a regulator.
76
Essential data remedies escape some of these criticisms. First, the
nonrivalrous character of data "facilities" relieves courts of the analytical effort
otherwise required to prevent "congestion through competing uses" of physical
facilities with finite capacity.' Second, the data monopolist faces costs of
pi. Elhauge, supra note 61, at 31o; see Novell, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 731 F. 3d 1O64, 1075-77
(ioth Cir. 2013).
72. See Olympia Equip. Leasing Co. v. W. Union Tel. Co., 797 F.2d 370, 377 (7th Cir. 1986);
Elhauge, supra note 61, at 312.
73. See, e.g., Aspen Skiing, 472 U.S. at 609.
74. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 55, at 339 (arguing that the essential facilities doctrine "requires
a court to set terms and conditions of the sale, thus turning it into a kind of regulatory
agency"); Frank H. Easterbrook, Essay: The Chicago School and Exclusionary Conduct, 31
HARv. J.L. & PuB. POL'Y 439,442 (2008) ("Anyone who thinks that judges would be good at
detecting the few situations in which cooperation would do more good than harm has not
studied the history of antitrust.").
75. Frank H. Easterbrook, On Identifying Exclusionary Conduct, 61 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 972,
977-78 (1986) ("Judges hearing antitrust cases have a lousy record in separating economic
wisdom from fallacy."); see also Novell, Inc., 731 F.3d at 1075 (describing the complexity of
identifying exclusionary practice); Elhauge, supra note 61, at 255 (critiquing the "vacuous"
standards used to determine which actions are exclusionary).
76. See, e.g., Verizon Commc'ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, 540 U.S. 398, 408
(2004) ("Enforced sharing.., requires antitrust courts to act as central planners,... a role
for which they are ill suited."); Areeda, supra note 24, at 853; Frank H. Easterbrook,
Correspondence: Workable Antitrust Policy, 84 MIcH. L. REv. 1696, 1700-01 (1986).
77. Spencer Weber Waller, Areeda, Epithets, and Essential Facilities, 2oo8 Wis. L. REV. 359, 373;
see Frischmann & Waller, supra note 24, at 13 ("For partially non-rivalrous resources of finite
capacity, the cost-benefit analysis is more complicated because of the possibility of
congestion through competing uses and users."); cf. Hecht v. Pro-Football, Inc., 570 F.2d
982, 992-93 (D.C. Cir. 1977) ("[T]he antitrust laws do not require that an essential facility
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sharing that likely approach zero; 78 any nonzero costs likely arise from markets
for commoditized infrastructure, such as servers, bandwidth, or processors.
Therefore, no sustained judicial inquiry into industry idiosyncrasies or extant
plant characteristics would be necessary to determine the sharing costs borne
by data monopolists.79
Finally, courts can preserve incentives to invest by permitting data
monopolists to recover their average total costs.8 0 Courts have long paired cost
recovery with the essential facilities doctrine.s' The standard-which includes a
reasonable return on capital- "reflects equilibrium in the market for
investment. "82
The argument that innovators and their backers require higher than
reasonable returns to capital presumes that one firm-but not others-can
identify a superior investment opportunity. Theories of efficient capital
markets, however, deny that such opportunities for arbitrage exist.3 Together,
these observations suggest that courts may more easily administer access to
data than to physical facilities.
be shared if such sharing would be impractical or would inhibit the defendant's ability to
serve its customers adequately."); United States v. AT&T, 524 F. Supp. 1336, 136o-61
(D.D.C. 1981) (describing "problems of feasibility and practicability" that courts may
consider in context of essential facilities doctrine).
78. See, e.g., eBay, Inc. v. Bidder's Edge, Inc., loo F. Supp. 2d. 1058, 1O63 (N.D. Cal. 2000)
(explaining that aggregator requests comprised between 0.7 percent and i.i percent of data
transferred by an auction site over ten months; the cost of service totaled between $45,323
and $61,804); cf Maureen A. O'Rourke, Shaping Competition on the Internet: Who Owns
Product and Pricing Information?, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1965, 198o-81 (2000) (suggesting that an
access regime would not lead to a debilitating volume of access requests).
79. See Town of Concord, Mass. v. Bos. Edison Co., 915 F.2d 17, 25 (ist Cir. 199o) (describing
the difficulties of administering access remedies).
8o. BRETT M. FRISCHMANN, INFRAsTRUcTURE: THE SocIAL VALUE OF SHARED RESOURCES 176
(2012) (quoting John F. Duffy, Comment, Intellectual Property Isolationism and the Average
Cost Thesis, 83 TEx. L. REv. 1O77, 1079 (2005)); cf. Jeffrey L. Harrison, A Positive Externalities
Approach to Copyright Law: Theory and Application, 13 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 1, 15 (2005) ("No
costs beyond the minimum necessary to bring copyright-worthy works into existence
should be incurred.").
81. E.g., United States v. Terminal R.R. Ass'n, 224 U.S. 383, 411 (1912) (structuring a grant of
competitor access upon "use, character, and cost of service"); United States v. Realty Multi-
List, Inc., 629 F.2d 1351, 1386 (sth Cir. 198o) (holding that the defendant in an essential
facilities case "must be allowed to establish fee schedules which allow it to recoup its costs of
operation").
8z. FRIscHMANN, supra note 8o, at 176.
83. Cf. Duffy, supra note 8o, at 1078-79 ("If investors in intellectual property creation were
recovering more than their average fixed costs needed to produce the intellectual property,
something would seem wrong. But what would be wrong is that the market in investment
would not be in equilibrium.").
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ESSENTIAL DATA
D. Consumer Welfare
The benefits of access to data should also enter the analysis of courts
confronted with claims to essential data. In no markets do monopoly prices
produce static deadweight loss more than in markets for information.a
4
Further, refusals to deal essential data stall innovation. Data power many
applications: Twitter data have predicted social unrest and power outages and
directed humanitarian aid.ss In that regard, data resemble technologies that
support multiple rounds of innovation. 6
Innovation scholars suggest that unqualified control of such technology
"tends to hinder technical progress."8 ' First movers focus on past experiencess8
or lack expertise to develop all applications8 9 Improvers who would build on
data may fail to secure permission to do so because monopolists hold divergent
beliefs about an improvement's value. 90
84. See Kenneth J. Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention, in THE
RATE AND DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE ACTIvITY: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL FACTORS 609, 614-15
(Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Res. ed., 1962) ("If [the cost of transmitting information] were zero,
then optimal allocation would obviously call for unlimited distribution of the information
without cost.").
85. Elizabeth Dwoskin, Twitter's Data Business Proves Lucrative, WALL ST. J., Oct. 7,
2013, http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SBooo1424o527o2344414o45791i8531954483974
[http://perma.cc/E356-E7XH].
86. Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On Limiting or Encouraging Rivalry in Technical
Progress: The Effect of Patent Scope Decisions, 25 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 1, 7 (1994)
[hereinafter Merges & Nelson, The Effect of Patent Scope Decisions]; cf. FRISCHMANN, supra
note 80, at 253 ("Intellectual infrastructure, such as basic research [and] ideas,
facilitat[es] a wide range of downstream productive activities .... ").
87. Merges & Nelson, The Effect of Patent Scope Decisions, supra note 86, at 1; see Robert P.
Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope, 90 COLUM. L. REV.
839, 844 (199o) [hereinafter Merges & Nelson, Complex Economics]; see also Merges &
Nelson, Complex Economics, at 872 (offering theoretical justifications for the historical
account).
88. Merges & Nelson, Complex Economics, supra note 87, at 873.
89. See VIKTOR MAYER-SCHONBERGER & KENNETH CUKIER, BIG DATA 124 (2013) (arguing that
data monopolists "don't necessarily have the right skills to extract [data's] value or to
generate creative ideas about what is worth unleashing"); Mark Lemley, Ex Ante Versus Ex
Post Justifications for Intellectual Property, 71 U. CHI. L. Rav. 129, 137 (2004) ("Creators are
often terrible managers. They frequently misunderstand the significance of their own
invention and the uses to which it can be put."); Suzanne Scotchmer, Standing on the
Shoulders of Giants: Cumulative Research and the Patent Law, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 29, 32-35
(1991)-
go. Merges & Nelson, The Effect of Patent Scope Decisions, supra note 86, at 5 ("Williamson's
theory . . .surely would lead one to suspect that it would be very difficult to work out
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Broad exclusion rights favor innovation and consumer welfare when "the
overall potential for modifications and improvements based on the original
achievement is relatively clear and bounded."" , Little suggests that essential
data fit that description": AOL failed to recognize that transaction data could
power the recommendation engine that Amazon built.93 Yahoo considered
creating a spell check tool from users' search engine queries, but it was Google
that actually pursued the project.
9 4
The welfare case for an essential data doctrine has caveats. I have simplified
questions of access quality over which parties have litigated in the last twenty
years. 9s I have assumed that conduct that resembles both exclusion and
justified competition excludes with frequency sufficient to justify scrutiny.6
But the prima facie case remains: revitalizing essential facilities in the context
of data may speed innovation and increase consumer welfare. 97
CONCLUSION
This Comment has argued that criticisms of the essential facilities doctrine
carry less weight when a dataset becomes the facility. In the data context, the
essential facilities doctrine captures suspect conduct and better withstands
criticisms linked to ex ante incentives. Remedies that enforce access to data
would entail less judicial inquiry into costs of service and facility capacity. The
case for any essential data doctrine will evolve with the objectives of aspiring
data monopolists. But that case will always build on the allocative inefficiencies
of information monopolies and their negative effects on innovation with data.
licensing arrangements regarding rights to what may be found or created prior to knowing
just what the inventions or discoveries will turn out to be.").
91. Id. at 7.
92. MAYER-SCHONBERGER & CUKIER, supra note 89, at 103 ("[T] he importance of data's reuse is
not fully appreciated in business and society. . . . (M]any Internet and technology
companies have been unaware until recently how valuable data's reuse can be.").
93. Id. at 1o5.
94. Id. at 112.
9s. See, e.g., Verizon Commc'ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, 540 U.S. 398, 403
(2004).
96. Frank H. Easterbrook, When Is It Worthwhile to Use Courts to Search for Exclusionary
Conduct?, 2003 COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 345, 345 ("The big problem lies in this: competitive and
exclusionary conduct look alike.").
97. Cf Frischmann & Waller, supra note 24, at 11-12 (arguing that infrastructure management
regimes that incorporate "open access[]" and nondiscriminatory terms "facilitate[]
competition downstream, innovation and experimentation with new uses, and often the
generation of positive externalities").
ESSENTIAL DATA
Essential data implicate networks through which consumers connect and
transact- activities fundamental to Internet economies. Courts and agencies
should consider whether a doctrine devised to safeguard competition in the last
century has become more salient in this one.
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Wayne Dale Collins, M.S., J.D.
Victoria A. Cundiff, BA, J.D.
Melanie L. Fein, B.A., J.D.
Eugene R. Fidell, BA., LL.B., Florence Rogatz Visiting Lecturer in Law
Gregory Fleming, B.A., J.D.
Lawrence J. Fox, B.A., J.D., George W. and Sadella D. Crawford Visiting Lecturer in Law
Stephen Fraidin, A.B., LL.B.
Peter T. Grossi, Jr., M.A., J.D.
Katherine M. Kimpel, BA., J.D.
Jeffrey A. Meyer, B.A., J.D.
Charles Nathan, BA., J.D.
Andrew J. Pincus, B.A., J.D.
Eric S. Robinson, M.BA., J.D.
Charles A Rohfeld, A.B., J.D.
Sarah Russell, BA., J.D.
John M. Samuels, J.D., LL.M., George W. and Sadella D. Crawford Visiting Lecturer in Law
Michael S. Solender, BA., J.D.
David J. Stoll, B.A., J.D.
Jacob J. Sullivan, M.Phil., J.D., OscarM. Ruebhausen Distinguished Visiting Lecturer in National Security
Stefan FL Underhill, BA., J.D.
John M. Walker, Jr., BA., J.D., George W and Sadella D. Crawford Visiting Lecturer in Law
David M. Zornow, BA., J.D.
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